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Abstract
Natural resource-related conflicts can be extremely destructive and undermine environmen-
tal protection. Since the 1990s co-management schemes, whereby the management of
resources is shared by public and/or private sector stakeholders, have been a main strategy
for reducing these conflicts worldwide. Despite initial high hopes, in recent years co-man-
agement has been perceived as falling short of expectations. However, systematic assess-
ments of its role in conflict prevention or mitigation are non-existent. Interviews with 584
residents from ten protected areas in Colombia revealed that co-management can be suc-
cessful in reducing conflict at grassroots level, as long as some critical enabling conditions,
such as effective participation in the co-management process, are fulfilled not only on paper
but also by praxis. We hope these findings will re-incentivize global efforts to make co-man-
agement work in protected areas and other common pool resource contexts, such as fisher-
ies, agriculture, forestry and water management.
Introduction
Protected areas are pivotal for preventing biodiversity loss worldwide [1,2]. Recent evidence
suggests that protected areas inhabited and/or managed by traditional communities are gener-
ally better preserved than areas governed by exclusionary conservation policies [3,4]. This does
not imply that such areas are devoid of problems. Their management generally involves contin-
uous dialogue and negotiation between indigenous and local communities on the one hand
and state and park authorities on the other. Conflicts between park administrations and local
communities (hereafter referred to as park–people conflicts) are some of the most pervasive
problems, and can be extremely destructive [5,6].
In an attempt to reconcile conservation objectives with local livelihood interests and poverty
alleviation, different strategies have been tested over the past decades to prevent and mitigate
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park–people conflicts in a peaceful manner. Among these, co-management has been one of the
primary strategies employed by park administrations worldwide since the 1990s [5,7]. Here, we
define it as participatory problem-solving arrangements in which the management of a terri-
tory or a set of natural resources is shared between a state administration and a community of
resource users [7–9]. While initially co-management raised high hopes, today’s understanding
is that it has not lived up to expectations [7,10] Widespread criticism has suggested that in
practice co-management tends to gloss over the institutional complexities posed by the man-
agement of common-pool resources [7,11,12]. Co-management has also been criticized as a
pretext to dissemble systems that empower the elite in the background while purporting to
open up participation (e.g. [13]). In some cases, co-management has been blamed to actually
exacerbate the conflict that it was intended to solve [5,9].
We hypothesize that part of the criticism on co-management results from the nature of clas-
sic evaluations. The majority of evaluation studies have only focused on conceptual assess-
ments of whether and how local governance schemes, including co-management, contribute to
the sustainable management of natural resources [14–17]. Systematic assessments of the role of
specific enabling co-management conditions in conflict prevention at grassroots level are non-
existent. Furthermore, co-management studies have traditionally approached state–commu-
nity cooperation schemes as though each side were a homogenous entity composed of mem-
bers who experience co-management (and conflict) in the same way. This ignores the fact that
state authorities and communities are rarely coherent and homogeneous units [9,18,19]. Com-
munity members often have divergent and incommensurable perceptions of resource manage-
ment and may experience co-management and conflict differently [20].
There is a pressing need for field assessments of the potential of co-management for lower-
ing the occurrence of conflict [5]. In this paper we address this gap in research by focusing on
the role of co-management in mitigating park-people conflicts in Colombia. Our goal was to
assess whether the fulfilment of enabling co-management conditions as perceived by residents
from ten Colombian national protected areas (NPAs) reduced their reported experience of
park-people conflicts.
Theoretical Context
Conflict
Scholars differ in opinion on the best way to identify conflict and elucidate its underlying
causes. Conflict has traditionally been defined as differences in goals, perceptions or interests
between different (groups of) individuals [21]. According to this approach, differences should
be appropriately addressed and reduced to reach effective conflict management. However, it is
increasingly argued that this traditional view of conflict is not helpful for the development of
lasting solutions to various natural resource-related conflicts because it does not distinguish
conflict from its underlying causes [22]. Conceptualizing conflict as ‘differences’ distracts
attention from the fact that non-conflict situations exist since ‘differences’ are inevitable in
almost all social encounters.
We therefore applied the more recently developed impairment approach [22,23] which
defines conflict as a situation in which an actor (here, local people) perceives ‘impairment’
through the action or behavior of another actor (here, generally the NPA administration as a
‘pars pro toto’, i.e. the state authorities it represents) due to their different perceptions, emo-
tions and interests. According to this theory, at its core, conflict is a two-actor situation in
which one actor, the “proponent”, acts to impair another actor, the “opponent”, with “actors”
representing individuals or organizations [22]. One of the advantages of the impairment
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approach is that the experience of an actor’s behaviour/action as impairment is the only defin-
ing element used to distinguish conflict from non-conflict situations [22,23].
Co-management
Understood as a system of joint decision making between state agencies and local communities,
co-management allows all parties involved to negotiate, define and guarantee equitable sharing
of management functions, entitlements and responsibilities for a given territory or set of natu-
ral resources [7,9,17]. Co-management thus distinguishes itself from other forms of participa-
tory natural resource management though application of a philosophy of power-sharing and
promoting partnerships [9]. Power-sharing arrangements can manifest themselves in many
forms, and this variation is often depicted along a continuum [e.g. 24]. At one extreme are
arrangements in which full control remains with the state agency, in spite of consultation with
local communities. At the opposite end are arrangements in which local communities possess
full control over the resources with little contribution from state agencies. Power-sharing
arrangements at either end of this continuum, and everywhere in between, are here referred to
as ‘co-management’.
It has hypothesised that an inverse relationship exists between sustainable resource manage-
ment, including conflict resolution, and the fulfilment of a number of enabling co-management
conditions, such as a sense of ownership over, or effective participation in, the co-management
process by all individuals affected [17,24–27]. Our identification of enabling conditions that
determine the potential for co-management to prevent or mitigate park–people conflicts is
based on related research domains of common property theory and institutional analysis [24–
28]. Within these theoretical frameworks, conflict resolution mechanisms are recognized as
one of the key design principles for robust institutions, whereby institutions are understood as
the conventions, values and formally sanctioned rules of a society that largely determine indi-
viduals’ perceptions of the world and their behavior in interacting with it [25]. Institutional
analysts argue that all resource management models are embedded in broader institutional
contexts and that (co)-management models can be understood as systems of governance, sug-
gesting high relevance of institutional analysis for the management of park–people conflicts
[25].
The literature on co-management has identified as many as 28 conditions that are critical
for the sustainable governance of common pool resources [24–27]. Several of these are directly
relevant for the contribution of co-management to conflict prevention and resolution. We
selected ten conditions, which allowed using individual participants’ judgments as the sole cri-
terion to assess the fulfilment of enabling co-management conditions (See Table 1 for full list
of conditions and sub-conditions). For example, we included effective participation, but dis-
carded enabling policies and legislations among the conditions. Our reasoning was that co-
management participants can be expected to be able to self-asses or explain their involvement
in making and changing co-management rules (i.e. a subcondition for 0effective participation0)
whereas all respondents could not realistically be expected to be aware of, or able to comment
on all relevant co-management-related legislations.
Materials and Methods
Research areas and background
Between 1 October 2011 and 31 August 2014, we carried out fieldwork in ten Colombian
NPAs (Fig 1), which are located in the main Colombian bio-cultural regions (Amazon, Andes,
Caribbean and Pacific coasts) and are home to various indigenous, Afro-Colombian and settler
communities. These NPAs covered surface areas from 1,000 to 1,000,000 hectares; some were
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created decades ago while others came into existence more recently. Due to the complexities of
the NPAs (in terms of size, high numbers of ethnic groups, the presence of armed groups, diffi-
culties of access, etc.) we focused on specific subareas defined on the basis of socio-cultural and
geographical coherence. For some NPAs we selected more than one subarea (Table 2).
In response to conservation failures and escalating park–people conflicts, the Colombian
Ministry of Environment adopted a new conservation approach in 2001, which abandons the
absolutist conservationist stance (i.e. parks without people) and focuses instead on dialogue
and participation, drawing upon co-management and participatory conservation models [29].
Until now there have been no attempts to assess the effectiveness of these models. Overall, our
study cases represent a variety of park-people conflicts, against a background of variable
degrees of co-management (Table 2).
Data collection and analysis
We interviewed 584 representatives of various resident indigenous, Afro-Colombian and new-
comer groups, such as small-scale farmers and fisher communities [30]. Nineteen of them did
not actually live in the subareas mentioned above, but were nonetheless residents of the visited
parks (Table 2). Interviews were conducted during several field trips, mostly in the local settle-
ments (e.g. in respondents’ houses or public places). Committed to abide to ethical standards,
Table 1. Enabling co-management conditions and interpretation.
Co-management
conditions
Co-management sub-conditions
Individual incentive Participants feel that the co-management process beneﬁts them and that they
are better off complying than not complying with rules
Alternatives are provided in case of access restriction
Coordinating body There is a formal and operative body for co-management representing all
stakeholder groups
Trust Participants trust NPA functionaries
Ownership Participants agree with the area of interest being a NPA and are willing to obey
legislation and management rules
In cases where there is some form of co-management, participants support it
Effective participation Participants are involved in making and changing rules
Local leaders are involved in making and changing rules
There is at least one person of the local community appointed as park
employee
Free access to
information
Participants have free access to information (budgets, operational plans, etc.)
when required
Clear objectives Participants are aware of and understand basic NPA and co-management
objectives, activities and scope. This includes for example whether or not
people know if they live inside or outside the NPA, who else is involved in
the co-management, etc.
Empowerment There is capacity building related to NPA and co-management objectives and
activities if relevant. This includes the socialization of the NPA Management
Plan to the community.
Compliance NPA Administration complies with prior informed consent procedures and/or
with other (co-management) agreements and commitments
Conﬂict management There exists a formal, identiﬁed, consensual and functioning conﬂict
management mechanism at the local level, where solutions to conﬂicts can
be quickly resolved
There is regular and informal communication between both parties about how
conﬂicts can be resolved
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0144943.t001
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we always tried to protect participants’ rights and privacy as much as possible. The scholarship
for this research was approved without the need for evaluation of an ethics committee or IRB
because of the nature of the interviews. The purpose of the study was not to observe, study or
test individuals but rather to collect aggregated data for the evaluation of our research
Fig 1. Location of the visited NPAs (for more details please see Table 2).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0144943.g001
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hypotheses. Also, we did not try to obtain access to traditional knowledge, or to other types of
knowledge protected by international or national regulations and legislation. We only asked
questions to people about their individual experience of conflict with NPA administrations,
and their perceptions of the fulfilment of enabling conditions considered necessary for exoge-
nously imposed co-management schemes to work (see S1 Table for list of interview questions).
The participating communities and Colombian NPA administration fully authorized this
working method and the latter formalized its agreement with this research in a written
document.
When arriving to each of the participating communities, in a first step permission was
obtained from organized community assemblies, during which we thoroughly explained the
goals and limitations of the research. Based on this, the communities collectively decided if,
and under what conditions we were allowed to carry out interviews. In a next step we sought
Table 2. Characteristics of the NPAs and study areas considered in this paper.
NPA Region Year of NPA
creation
Surface area
(ha)
Areas of residence of respondents (N = 2584) Co-management in the
selected study areas
SFF Los Flamencos Caribbean 1977 7,615 Cari Cari and Palaima (n = 8) No
Indigenous Wayuu collective territory “Perratpu”
(case Flamencos) (n = 43)
Yes
Displaced community near Tocoromana (n = 9) No
Afro-Colombian communities Los Cocos and
Camarones (n = 7)
No study area
Tayrona • Settler/ﬁsher communities Tayrona (case
Tayrona) (n = 61)
• No
Caribbean 1964 15,000 Indigenous community Tayrona (n = 4) No study area
Sierra Nevada de
Santa Marta
Caribbean 1964 383,000 Settler communities La Lenguëta (case Sierra
Nevada) (n = 60)
No
Indigenous collective territory Kogui-Malayo-
Arhuaco (n = 10)
No
Indigenous community Kankuamo (n = 1) No study area
SFF Los Colorados Caribbean 1977 1,000 Settler communities Los Colorados (case
Colorados) (n = 38)
No
Utria Paciﬁc 1987 54,300 Afro-Colombian community councils (case Utria
Afro-Colombian) (n = 66)
Yes
Indigenous collective territory “Jurubida-Chori-Alto
Baudo” (case Utria indigenous) (n = 41)
Yes
Indigenous collective territory Alto Rio Valle Boro
Boro (n = 1)
No study area
Los Farallones Paciﬁc 1968 205,266 Afro-Colombian community councils Los
Farallones (n = 8)
Yes
Uramba Bahia
Malaga
Paciﬁc 2010 47,094 Afro-Colombian community councils Bahia Malaga
(case Bahia Malaga) (n = 74)
Yes
Paramillo Andes 1977 460,000 Indigenous collective territory “Yaberarado” (case
Paramillo) (n = 20)
Yes
Indigenous collective territory “Pollines” (n = 2) No study area
Puracé Andes 1975 83,000 Indigenous collective territory Puracé (case
Puracé)
No
Indigenous collective territory Rio Blanco (n = 2) No study area
Settler community Puracé (n = 2) No study area
Yaigojé-Apaporis Amazon 2009 1,056,023 Indigenous collective territory “Yaigojé-Apaporis”
(case Yaigojé-Apaporis) (n = 85)
Yes
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0144943.t002
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every individual respondent’s verbal informed consent before proceeding with the interview.
For participants under the age of 18, consent was sought and obtained from their parents and/
or guardians. Consent was recorded in writing by the interviewer. We always interviewed com-
munity leaders first (i.e. presidents of the community councils, teachers, traditional leaders,
etc.) to obtain a general overview of the local context. Next, we interviewed individual commu-
nity members making sure to select a representative sample of different interest groups. All
conversations were recorded in writing during interview sessions. Audio recordings were not
used and data was treated anonymously and confidentially.
During interviews we collected data on: (i) a set of personal attributes (sex, age, income and
education level, ethnic background, residence status, position in the community, language pro-
ficiency, economic and productive activities, work relation with NPA administration, and land
occupation and tenure); (ii) experience of park–people conflicts; and (iii) perception of the ful-
filment of enabling co-management conditions (see S1 Table for a list of interview questions).
Our approach to analyse conflict and the capacity of co-management to prevent or mitigate
it builds on the widely shared and applied Thomas Theorem—“if men [sic] define situations as
real, they are real in their consequences” [31], thus accommodating the fact that people’s per-
ceptions are decisive for their experience of conflict. Moreover, people also act upon their per-
ceptions, according to this theory, thus (re)producing more or less intense conflict situations.
To capture such perceptions, research methods should pay thorough attention to people’s sub-
jective meanings and experiences. To assess individual respondents’ experiences of park-people
conflicts, we explicitly asked them to free-list all types of actions they perceived as impairment.
All interviews were carried out by the first author; hence potential interviewer bias can be
expected to be constant across the cases.
Collinearity of enabling conditions has been raised as an issue in co-management assess-
ments [16,32]. However, neither the set of enabling conditions, nor the conflict categories we
selected showed strong signs of collinearity (variance inflation factors smaller than 10 and 2,
respectively), justifying their inclusion [33]. We applied an iterative modelling approach based
on Aikake’s information criteria (AIC) [34]—employing generalized linear models with a bino-
mial distribution and logit link function—to identify potential explanatory variables that signif-
icantly contributed to explaining the experience of conflict by respondents and, hence, to
evaluate the power of co-management to prevent or mitigate conflict. The response variable
was the proportion of most-important conflicts reported to be experienced by individual
respondents. Our initial set of explanatory variables was a combination of the perceived degree
of fulfilment of the different enabling conditions by respondents and the set of personal attri-
butes mentioned above (i.e. sex, age, etc.). We also examined pairwise relationships between
the fulfilment of different co-management conditions and the reported experience of different
park–people conflicts by means of logistic generalized linear models.
Results and Discussion
All conflict situations mentioned by the respondents were organised across nine categories, of
which we will focus on the five most important ones, being those reported by more than one
third of all respondents, i.e. constrained socio-economic development, access restriction, non-
compliance, constrained communication and participation, and imposition of exogenous
objectives (see Table 3 for full definitions).
The most parsimonious combination of variables that explained people’s experience of con-
flict were: (i) the area where a person resided; (ii) trust in NPA staff and (iii) the feeling that
they could effectively participate in the co-management process (Table 4). This means that it is
the simplest plausible subset of all the variables we measured that best explain the variation in
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the numbers of conflict categories reported by the people we interviewed. It does not mean that
the other variables are necessarily insignificant, as discussed below.
The importance of a person’s residence was not related to the existence of a formal co-man-
agement agreement between local communities and NPA administration. In four of the six
study areas (n20) where co-management agreements had been signed, respondents reported
a similar number of conflict as in the four areas where such agreements were lacking (Fig 2).
The fulfilment, as perceived by respondents, of co-management conditions was a more impor-
tant predictor of conflict than the actual existence of a written co-management agreement.
Only in those study areas where co-management agreements had been signed and where more
than half of the respondents considered more than half of the enabling conditions to be ful-
filled, were individual experiences of conflict close to zero (Fig 2). It is interesting to note that
while for most study areas there was quite some variation in the number of conflict conditions
reported by the respondents, there seemed to be more agreement on the proportion of co-man-
agement conditions perceived to be fulfilled, as evidenced by the wide and narrow nature of
boxplots on the left and right panels of Fig 2, respectively. These findings were anticipated
since conflict is influenced by many factors, including personal ones, whereas the fulfillment of
co-management conditions can be expected more a matter of external factors, and hence less
Table 3. Five most important conflict categories reported by respondents (N = 584).
Constrained socio-economic development (reported by 50% of respondents) covers three types of
conﬂicts. First, it refers to a restriction of infrastructure development enforced by the NPA administration
(mainly house building projects). Second, it includes the impediment of certain local development
projects (e.g. the building of a school, community-based tourism activities, road construction, the
provision of public services such as natural gas or electricity); and thirdly, it refers to limited or non-
existent sharing of beneﬁts resulting from NPA-governed activities (e.g. income from tourism).
Access restriction (48%) denotes actions intended to prevent people from having access to a particular
resource or area while often at the same time ensuring the imposer’s own access to it. Access
restrictions vary in scale and intensity, and can be summarized as: (i) restriction on extraction and/or use
of natural resources (e.g. timber extraction, ﬁshing and hunting, cattle breeding, agricultural practices,
etc.); (ii) restriction on access to land and/or entrance to territory (e.g. people are not allowed to stay
overnight within the NPA as they did before, or have to pay entrance fees; children are not permitted to
enter the NPA); and (iii) restriction on land tenure regimes and rights, including the obstruction of the
legalization or formalization of land ownership and prohibition of selling and buying of land.
Non-compliance (47%) with agreements or previously deﬁned rules can also lead to conﬂict. NPA
administration is often accused of not complying with: (i) prior-informed consent procedures (PICP; e.g.
related with the appointment of park functionaries or the approval of scientiﬁc research projects); (ii) (co-
management) agreements and promises to adequately reﬂect community interests in NPA management
plans and development projects; and (iii) promises to support community-based organizations. Some
community members also complained about the cancellation of meetings by NPA ofﬁcials without clear
justiﬁcation. We have grouped all these conﬂicts together as respondents generally did not distinguish
between non-compliance with PICP and non-compliance with (co-management) arrangements.
Constrained communication and participation (42%) refers to actions that intentionally or
unintentionally limit participation of stakeholders in NPA and co-management decision-making. We
distinguish between four dimensions of constrained participation: (i) constrained or restricted local
leadership in NPA management and administration; (ii) a limited number of local park employees; (iii)
constrained or limited coordination and communication between NPA staff and local communities; and
(iv) barriers to community access to information (or non-availability in the appropriate language): e.g. no
or limited access to NPA budget, proﬁt and expense ﬁgures; limited or non-existent information ﬂow
about the location of NPA borders, NPA objectives, the environmental legislative framework, authorized
and forbidden activities, ongoing research (projects), agreements signed between NPA administration
and local leaders, etc. Furthermore, in some cases there seemed to be a lack of environmental
education. Respondents complained that they were being forbidden certain activities without knowing or
understanding the environmental motives underlying these restrictions.
Imposition of exogenous objectives (38%) refers to actions undertaken to implement or pursue
management objectives or goals of a particular stakeholder group (i.e. NPA administration) beyond the
will or interests of other groups (i.e. the community). For instance, NPA Administration was accused by
some of enforcing the imposition of NPAs on ancestral lands, and of the forced removal or resettlement
of communities outside NPAs.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0144943.t003
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susceptible to high variation between individuals. If this interpretation is correct, the results
suggest that the median values of proportions reported by respondents per area (Fig 2 right
panel), are likely to be realistic approximations of reality. Only for the two areas where respon-
dents said more than half of the co-management conditions to be fulfilled (i.e. Paramillo and
Yaigojé-Apaporis), perceptions of the numbers of fulfilled co-management conditions were
more variable, the reason for which is less clear to us.
Interestingly, our most parsimonious model solution suggests that co-management condi-
tions were more decisive determinants of people’s reported experiences of conflict than social
diversity characteristics such as sex, ethnic background or level of education (Table 4). From a
Table 4. The most parsimonious set of variables retained by iterative modeling approach based on generalized linear model with a binomial distri-
bution and logit link function (only study areas with at least 8 respondents; N = 565). The first line reports on residual deviance and AIC of the model. In
the next lines, values for these parameters are given for the case in which each individual variable is removed from the model, together with the significance
of the difference. This model explains 59% of the null deviance.
Explanatory variable Df Deviance AIC LRT Pr (>Chi)
100.25 395.14
Area where a person resides 13 159.27 428.16 59.019 7.7e-08
Effective participation condition 1 112.46 405.34 12.203 4.8e-04
Trust condition 1 111.76 404.64 11.504 6.9e-04
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0144943.t004
Fig 2. Distribution of the experience of conflict and the perception of the fulfillment of co-management conditions according to residents of the
different study areas where n20 (N = 530). Distributions were significantly different (P<<0.001) across study areas (Kruskall-Wallis chi-squared = 177.04
and 352.39 for conflict and co-management conditions, respectively). Letters indicate groups of study areas with similar distributions, based on multiple
comparison post-hoc tests (threshold at P 0.01)[35].
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0144943.g002
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policy perspective, this is encouraging, as state authorities might find it more straightforward
to influence the fulfilment of enabling conditions than to influence most social diversity attri-
butes, at least in the short term.
Although proportionally few people considered more than five enabling co-management
conditions to be met (11%), we found a strong inverse relationship between the fulfilment of
enabling conditions and the perception of conflict by respondents. Fig 3 shows that the vast
majority of people who considered at least four conditions to be met (85 out of 114; 75%) did
not experience any conflict.
Fig 3. Conflicts reported to be experienced by people as a function of the number of co-management conditions perceived to be fulfilled (GLMwith
binomial distribution and logit link function; N = 584; z = -5.68; P = 1.3e-8). A condition was considered fulfilled if at least one of its sub-conditions was
met (see Table 1 for list of sub-conditions). This model explains 11% of the null deviance.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0144943.g003
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In line with the variables retained by our model (Table 4), the most effective combination of
co-management conditions was trust in NPA staff and effective participation: 96% of respon-
dents who considered these conditions fulfilled reported no experience of conflict (Fig 4). This
finding suggests that trust-building and ensuring the effective participation are the most deci-
sive factors among the extensive list of conditions for lowering conflict listed in Table 1. Hence,
they should be priority tasks for governments and NPA administrations interested in prevent-
ing or mitigating park-people conflicts on a tight budget.
The importance of trust and effective participation for participatory environmental man-
agement is well-documented in literature. Environmentalists, policy practitioners and research
scholars have repeatedly highlighted the vital role of participation and public involvement in a
range of conservation development concerns, including implementing policies for environ-
mental protection, and co-management [25,36–38]. Participation can improve learning pro-
cesses and the quality of decision-making. It encourages empowerment, democratic citizenship
and public support for planning decisions. As a consequence, it can lead to effective and
Fig 4. Distribution of the reported experience of conflict and the perception of the fulfilment of trust and effective participation conditions
according to residents of the different study areas.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0144943.g004
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efficient implementation processes as well as the prevention or mitigation of conflicts [38,39].
Likewise, trust has been identified as a highly influential factor in the success or failure of envi-
ronmental management and cooperation agreements [27,28,40,41]. Trust is a key requisite for
peace building within participatory resource management processes [27,28,40] and a vast liter-
ature exists about the factors that make the greatest contribution towards building trust
between individuals, groups and the organizations and societies to which they belong (e.g. [25,
40–42]).
An evaluation of pairwise relations between the reported fulfilment of conditions and expe-
riences of conflict revealed that, although the level of fulfilment of most conditions reported by
respondents was generally low, all but two co-management conditions correlated negatively
with at least one conflict category. Table 5 suggests that, in addition to (i) trust-building
between local people and NPA staff, and (ii) ensuring local people’s effective participation in
Table 5. Pairwise relations between idiosyncratic perceptions of the fulfillment of co-management conditions and the reported experience of con-
flict categories, based on GLMs with binomial distribution and logit link function. Numbers correspond to z and P values; significant at P<0.01 are in
bold. All significant relations refer to inverse correlations. Percentages in row and column heads refer to the number of respondents experiencing different
conflict categories and considering a specific enabling condition fulfilled. For enabling conditions with sub-conditions (see Table 1), degree of fulfillment was
calculated as the proportion of all sub-conditions queried.
Conﬂict
categories
Constrained
development
(52%)
Non-
compliance
(48%)
Access
restriction
(49%)
Constrained
participation
(43%)
Imposition
objectives
(38%)
Total number of
conﬂicts
experienced
Co-management
conditions
Individual
incentive (10%)
Z = -4.13 -3.25 -3.89 -3.52 -3.30 -4.34
P = 3.6e-05 1.14e-03 1.02e-04 4.31e-04 9.71e-04 1.41e-05
Coordinating body
(8%)
Z = -4.1 -3.88 -3.35 -3.5 -2.88 -4.66
P = 4.09e-05 1.05e-04 8.17e-04 4.59e-04 4.02e-03 3.11e-06
Trust (6%) Z = -4.23 -4.15 -3.07 -3.07 -3.12 -4.51
P = 2.32e-05 3.33e-05 2.12e-03 2.17e-03 1.79e-03 6.61e-06
Ownership (16%) Z = -5.48 -4.11 -5.16 -3.31 -2.07 -4.87
P = 4.27e-08 4e-05 2.53e-07 9.22e-04 3.85e-02 1.12e-06
Effective
participation
(20%)
Z = -4.41 -4.46 -3.59 -0.31 -1.42 -3.78
P = 1.04e-05 8.14e-06 3.27e-04 7.57e-01 1.56e-01 1.59e-04
Free access to
information
(3%)
Z = -2.64 -2.58 -2.02 -1.84 -1.88 -2.85
P = 8.38e-03 9.76e-03 4.32e-02 6.55e-02 6.01e-02 4.44e-03
Clear objectives
(5%)
Z = -3.43 -1.43 -2.75 -1.86 -0.91 -2.36
P = 6.07e-04 1.52e-01 6e-03 6.35e-02 3.64e-01 1.84e-02
Empowerment
(7%)
Z = -3.37 -1.5 -2.06 0.43 -2.37 -2.35
P = 7.45e-04 1.32e-01 3.92e-02 6.66e-01 1.76e-02 1.89e-02
Compliance (4%) Z = -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -2.37 -0.02 -2.29
P = 9.84e-01 9.84e-01 9.84e-01 1.77e-02 9.85e-01 2.22e-02
Conﬂict
management
(3%)
Z = -1.69 -9.74e-01 -1.65 -8.66e-01 -6.16e-01 -1.35
P = 9.04e-02 3.3e-01 9.98e-02 3.86e-01 5.38e-01 1.77e-01
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0144943.t005
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the co-management process, priority conditions in which governments and park administra-
tions should invest are: (iii) stimulate ownership over the co-management process, (iv) opera-
tionalize a coordinating body and (v) create individual incentives, all of which significantly
lowered the experience of at least four out of five conflict categories.
Conclusion
In recent years, co-management has lost much of its appeal as an effective mechanism for pre-
venting or resolving natural resource-related conflicts worldwide. In contrast to this under-
standing, our findings reveal -for the first time quantitatively- that it is premature to discard
co-management as a tool for conflict resolution. We call upon park administrations and policy-
makers to invest in ensuring the fulfilment of enabling conditions for co-management not only
on paper, but also, and more importantly, by praxis. Our findings suggest that building trust
between partners and achieving more effective participation of local groups in NPA manage-
ment are most-important conditions to prevent or mitigate park-people conflicts, which can be
a daunting task, but surely far from impossible. Dismissing the potential effectiveness of co-
management is likely to result in the status quo of conflicts, or lead to their escalation, with
potentially detrimental consequences for the conservation of biodiversity. This is particularly
relevant for countries such as Colombia, which are in post-conflict decision-making processes
at numerous levels.
Looking ahead, further work is necessary to determine to what extent the outcomes of this
study can be generalized to co-management schemes in protected areas and other common
property contexts in the global South, such as in fisheries or forestry. Also, indicators to moni-
tor the state and progress of the fulfilment of enabling conditions will need to be developed
and measured. Furthermore, a number of other outstanding research questions remain. More
work is necessary to improve our understanding of the extent to which the number of conflicts
experienced by respondents reflect their actual manifestation or escalation on the ground. His-
tory has taught that certain tipping points must be crossed for conflict to escalate, but it is not
clear if this also applies to park-people conflicts, and if so, how to ensure conflict to stay within
constructive limits (e.g. [43]). Lastly, more research is necessary to better understand if and
how the fulfilment of co-management conditions on the ground actually also results in
improved biodiversity conservation in protected areas.
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